In October, 1962, President Kennedy--consciously risking nuclear war--declared a blockade of Cuba contingent on the removal of all Soviet missiles from the island. Here are Robert Kennedy's recollections of his brother's management of the crisis and his own central role in implementing policy. The timetable is of great importance, and the book is organized chronologically. The high-level advisors (McNamara and sometimes Rusk, RFK and occasionally LBJ and Stevenson, the Russian and Latin American experts, and the heads of CIA and the Joint Chiefs) met daily to determine whether a ""surgical air strike"" was required or, if at least initially, the quarantine would be sufficient. The President made all final decisions, relied heavily on RFK both to draft diplomatic letters and to meet with the Soviet Ambassador, and often was content to let the Secretary of State tend to other, less important international problems. Presumably for this reason RFK includes a lengthy analysis of the role of a Secretary of State. The question of the ""moral position"" of a large nation attacking a small one is raised briefly, and the need for civilian control over military hawkishness is pressed. McNamara and Dean Acheson are singled out for kudos, while the error-prone are not identified. This is valuable not only as a record of the operations of the Administration during the great facedown, but as an instance of responsible brinkmanship.