TRUMAN AND THE BOMB

A document-grounded argument that Harry Truman made the right decision by dropping the atomic bomb.

Military historian Giangreco rejects the claim, by “revisionist historians,” that “none of the options explored by President Truman and his contemporaries—atom bomb, invasion, or both—was warranted.” The underlying premise of that idea was that Japan was preparing to surrender, which Giangreco further rejects. He argues that Japan was prepared to resist to the last with a still-powerful army, as well as that American losses in the event of an invasion could exceed the estimate of 1,000,000 that has often been cited. The planks of Giangreco’s case are repetitive but painstakingly laid out, and the author pursues several topics around which historical and popular controversy have formed. One, following Truman’s own memoirs, concerns his supposed ignorance of the Manhattan Project and its implications. Although he needed to be brought up to speed, a memorandum from Secretary of War Henry Stimson indicates that he was fully briefed on the matters. A second topic is the involvement of the Soviet Union, which declared war on Japan late in 1945—and which, thanks to a little-reported lend-lease program, was preparing to use American amphibious craft to invade northern Japan “before their embattled comrades in the Maritime Provinces and the port of Vladivostok finally ran out of bullets, borscht, and men.” The most important documents involve those casualty figures, and by Giangreco’s account, they support his often stated contention that the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima saved millions of lives—not just Americans, who were suffering losses in conventional warfare of some 65,000 “killed, wounded, and missing each and every month during the ‘casualty surge’ of June 1944 to June 1945,” but also as many as 20 million Japanese.

An arguable but handy reference for students of world history and the war in the Pacific.