ROAD TO SURRENDER

An exploration of the moral quandaries that surrounded the atomic bombing of Japan.

Japan had barely surrendered, recounts Thomas, when Americans of goodwill began to question whether the nuclear destructions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been necessary. At the end of his life, former Secretary of War Henry Stimson, one of Thomas’ subjects, spoke of “the wrongness and folly of using nuclear weapons.” Gen. Carl Spaatz, another of those subjects, reckoned that the campaign of firebombing Japanese targets would be better mounted with precision bombing of rail lines to prevent foods from reaching the heavily populated Kanto Plain, reducing Japan by famine and what was sure to be a resulting civil war. Yet, Thomas writes, despite the quiet workings of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to maneuver his nation toward surrender, key Japanese military leaders had no intention of doing so. This leads Thomas to revisit, throughout his narrative, the old question of whether the atomic bomb was necessary, which, with a nuanced argument that’s still likely to stir up controversy, he answers in the affirmative. Apart from averting a projected 1 million American casualties in an invasion of the homeland, he argues, “the atomic bombs not only saved many thousands and possibly millions of Japanese lives, they saved the lives of even more Asians beyond Japan.” Even after the atomic bombings, hawkish military and government factions threatened a coup against the emperor in order to continue the war. The author’s argument is well taken even though it does nothing to lessen the moral anguish that his principals—to say nothing of Einstein, Oppenheimer, and even Truman as well as generations after them—felt over the decision to unleash nuclear terror on their enemy. In addition, notes Thomas, there was another bomb waiting in the event of continued war, this one destined for Tokyo.

A thoughtful study of nuclear war, its early discontents, and alternate scenarios that might have been worse.