THE DEVILS WILL GET NO REST

Despite a clash of egos and deep-seated differences, a crucial conclave mapped out a war-winning path.

Planning military strategy is an enormously difficult task; when several nations are involved, it becomes even more problematic. Conroy, the author of Lincoln’s White House, chronicles the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, when Churchill, Roosevelt, and their senior generals met to plan the next phase of World War II. The conflict was beginning to turn in favor of the Allies but was a long way from over, and there were serious divisions about how to proceed. A faction of the American delegation wanted to focus their attention on fighting the Japanese, while the British saw the Nazis as the principal enemy. There were also questions about when and how to launch an invasion of Europe and the likely postwar landscape. The French leaders, apparently more concerned with scoring political points than winning the war, were a constant irritant. Disagreements became heated and personal, but the delegation eventually hammered out a feasible plan. It involved the capture of Sicily to secure Mediterranean supply routes, an increase in the bombing campaign aimed at Germany, and a deferral of the invasion of Western Europe until more forces were gathered. While the British achieved most of what they wanted, it became clear that the U.S., as the critical source of manpower, materiel, and money, would henceforth be the dominant player of the Allies. The official minutes of the conference were published in 1973, but Conroy is a diligent researcher and finds some new material in participants’ diaries and correspondence, providing extra depth and color. Even though this is the first book-length analysis of the conference, the substance of the proceedings is already well known. For this reason, it will appeal mainly to aficionados of WWII history.

Conroy adds personality and background to the official account of the crucial Casablanca Conference.