RAIN OF RUIN

Historical account of the policies and strategies underlying the air war over Japan.

Overy, a British historian of World War II, does good service straightaway by showing that Britain, though “often overlooked in accounts of Japanese defeat,” was active in it: Winston Churchill approved the use of the atomic bomb, and, freed after Germany’s surrender, British bomber squadrons were on their way to join the Americans in the last months of the war in the Pacific. That war was long foreseen: For decades before Pearl Harbor, American and British war planners had gamed out numerous scenarios about fighting Japan, including the use of warplanes well before such warplanes even existed: “The doctrinal shape of the future bombing campaign against Japan was already developed long before there was any capability of achieving it.” It wasn’t until 1943, writes Overy, that the possibility began to emerge of land-based air facilities capable of putting planes in the sky over Japan. Once that became a reality with the capture of Saipan and other islands in 1944, America was ready to engage in a campaign of terror bombing that specifically targeted civilian populations—to which Overy attaches racist views of the Japanese as less than human. (Quoth Life magazine in May 1945: “hating Japs comes natural—­as natural as fighting Indians once was”). By Overy’s view, the atomic bombings were an extension of the firebombing of Japan’s cities—and even those two bombs were not the foremost causes for Japan to finally capitulate. Interestingly, Overy notes in closing that the German and Japanese bombings of civilians earlier in the war were not raised in war crimes trials “because British and American air forces had done exactly that, and deliberately, in the last years of war, abandoning the restrictions on targeting civilians in force when the war began.”

A fresh and persuasive outlook on one of the great moral crossroads in world history.