DETERMINED

A neuroscientific takedown of the notion that free will guides us.

The question of predestination versus free will has driven theological disputes for centuries. Stanford biology and neurology professor Sapolsky holds a seemingly simple but carefully elaborated view of the matter: “There is no free will, or at least…there is much less free will than generally assumed when it really matters.” Modern brain research shows that in decision making, for example, seldom do we deliberate on a matter, instead relying on a record of past behavior determined by neural responses and learned actions. Sapolsky notes that the difference between success and failure in academia is contingent on “the womb in which nine months were spent and the lifelong epigenetic consequences of that,” as well as material considerations such as being fed adequately in childhood. The lot of the “crack baby,” another charged example, is similarly determined by factors ranging from neurodevelopmental problems to being marooned in a poor neighborhood. Against Daniel Dennett and other philosophers of consciousness—a concept Sapolsky dismisses for the purposes of his argument—the author examines the ethical consequences of what happens to our notions of justice and punishment when we sideline the idea of free will. We’ve done so already, Sapolsky observes, in questions such as acts committed by the mentally ill, just as we’ve dismissed the idea that epilepsy is caused by demon possession. The author is fearless in taking on a matter that is fraught with a long history of debate and division, and he covers a wide variety of disciplines, from philosophy to ethics and law, with admirable clarity. Particularly provocative are his ideas about restorative justice and the contrarian suggestion that improving people’s lives might actually improve their behavior—and the human condition as a whole.

Sure to stir controversy, which, to judge by this long but lucid exposition, the author is perfectly willing to court.